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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals overlook the element of

causation by basing liability on the fact that the defendant knew he
would be the triggering mechanism for the drug transaction (as
opposed to actually being the triggering mechanism)?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously uphold the "drug

arrangement" statute (which is unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of this case because of the undercover agent's intervening
conduct)?

iii

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . .
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 provides in pertinent part:
58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties [Effective
until July 1, 1990].
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled
or counterfeit substance;
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit
substance with intent to distribute.

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON,

Case No. 890509-CA
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Defendant/Appellant.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pelton,
147 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1990), is attached hereto as
Appendix A.

On November 14, 1990, Petitioner timely filed a

Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals.

On November 28,

1990, the Court of Appeals denied Appellants Petition for
Rehearing.

A copy of that Court's order denying the Petition for

Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on
November 9, 1990. Appellant filed his Petition for Rehearing on
November 14, 1990 and it was denied on November 28, 1990. The
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari must be filed.

Utah R. App. P. 48(c).

Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore timely filed.

This
Utah R.

App. P. 48. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5)
(Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Offering, Agreeing, Consent, or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 1990).
After a bench trial held June 13, 1989, Mr. Pelton was convicted as
charged by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State charged Mr. Pelton with one count of Offering,
Agreeing, Consenting, or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled
Substance, to wit:

cocaine, a second degree felony.

The facts

pertinent to this case are stated in the Court of Appeals' decision
and, where appropriate, in the argument section of this petition.

- 2 -

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Proof of causation is a necessary element for a criminal
conviction.

The State never proved that the actions of the

Petitioner, Darrin Pelton, provided the necessary nexus for a drug
transaction.

Two separate sets of acts should be considered.

In

the first, Petitioner Pelton/s conduct—even if considered
improper—should not be deemed criminal because of the intervening
conduct of the involved undercover agent.

Petitioner cannot be

considered a "middleman" because he never linked the agent to the
next person involved in the drug transaction.

Secondly, the drug

transaction began anew after the agent told his informant to contact
a middleman (not the Petitioner) who, in turn, contacted a drug
dealer.

The Petitioner was not involved in the second transaction.
Utah's appellate courts have found individuals liable if

they "acted" in furtherance of a drug transaction.

The prohibition

against "any act," however, does not contemplate intervening conduct
by an agent which renders harmless the initial "culpable" conduct of
the involved individual.

By failing to account for the necessary

nexus or lack thereof, the Court of Appeals' decision did not
properly address the element of causation in an intended drug
transaction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DID
NOT CONSIDER THE ELEMENT OF CAUSATION
The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the
conduct of the Petitioner, Darrin Pelton, was "one link in a chain

- 3 -

of events . . . which eventually led to the sale of cocaine."
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
necessary link.

147

Petitioner Pelton did not constitute a

The "link," if any, broke when the undercover agent

voluntarily terminated Mr. Pelton's involvement.

Even if the Court

of Appeals correctly concluded that Mr. Pelton acted with the
requisite criminal intent, his behavior should not have been deemed
criminal without proof of the element of causation.

Causation was

never proven.
Utah appellate courts have decided countless cases
involving the sale of drugs, but they have never specifically
addressed exactly when, if ever, the intervening actions of an agent
will release the initial "participants" from criminal liability,
(i.e. should an involved individual always be considered liable, as
the Court of Appeals decision implies, no matter what the undercover
agent may later do or say to call off the planned "sting"
operation?)

At what point will the conduct of the agent preclude a

finding of causation?
Petitioner concedes that "middlemen" in the sale of drugs
can be held accountable for their involvement in the transaction.
However, "middlemen" no longer exist if an agent ends an intended
transaction and then begins another transaction on his own.

In such

a scenerio, as occurred in the case at bar, the "middleman" of the
initial transaction suddenly becomes the last link in an ill-advised
(but noncriminal) series of events.

- 4 -

Petitioner Pelton met an agent at a meeting place and
told him, in substance, to go to a 7-Eleven where they would call a
man and wait for the cocaine.

The Court of Appeals noted that "the

trial court could properly conclude that defendant [Pelton] knew
that he would be the triggering mechanism in bringing [agent] Acosta
and Paco together when he had Acosta drive to the 7-11 store, and
that he also knew the transaction involved the sale of cocaine."
Slip. op. at 3.

Knowing that one would be the triggering mechanism

as opposed to actually being the triggering mechanism are two very
different concepts.

Causation is shown only by proof of the latter

situation.
If Mr. Pelton had introduced the agent to the cocaine
dealer, the "link" would have continued with Mr. Pelton remaining
liable for his actions.

However, because the agent ended

Mr. Pelton's involvement at the 7-Eleven, and because the agent
initiated a new transaction by telling his informant to contact the
real "middleman," Lorraine Coates, who, in turn, introduced the
agent to the cocaine dealer, causation existed only for the second
transaction (with Coates—not Pelton—liable for "arranging" the
transaction).

No nexus linked the initial transaction involving

Mr. Pelton with the subsequent transaction involving Ms. Coates
because of the intervening conduct of the agent.
If other courts follow the Court of Appeals' decision in
the future (as undoubtedly will be the case with the ever present
nature of drug transactions), the decision will allow an agent to
arbitrarily end an intial transaction with one participant, begin
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another transaction an hour, a day, or a week later with another
participant, and then hold the initial participant liable for the
second transaction.

Greater guidelines must be incorporated into

the Court of Appeals' decision on the element of causation.

Nothing

stated in existing opinions specifically address the outer limits of
causation for drug transactions.
what is permissible.

Most opinions have stated only

See, e.g.. State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103

(Utah 1983).

POINT II. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO PETITIONERS CASE
Closely related to the arguments summarized above are
arguments pertaining to the all encompassing nature of the
applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8.

The statute prohibits

any person from "agreeing, consenting, offering, arranging, or
negotiating" the distribution of a controlled substance.

While

these five activities may be constitutionally proscribed, see
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), the type of proscribed
conduct which falls under each activity remains unclear.
Prior decisions have prohibited "any act" taken in
furtherance of arranging to distribute . . . a . . . controlled
substance . . . ." 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; see also State v. Gray,
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)) ("any witting or intentional lending of
aid in the distribution of drugs, in whatever form the aid takes, is
proscribed by the act").

However, an analysis addressing the

unconstitutionality of the "drug" statute as applied to the

- 6 -

potentially intervening actions of the undercover agent has never
been conducted by Utah's appellate courts. Absent such an analysis,
Petitioner submits that the nebulous definition did not give him
adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and was unconstitutional
as applied to him because "any act" did not contemplete intervening
conduct.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pelton respectfully requests this Court to grant his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the issues addressed
Jrf

herein.
SUBMITTED this

day of

ELIZABETH A y BOWMAN
Attornqyfar Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that ten copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

day of December, 1990.

DELIVERED by

this

of December, 1990.
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Cite as

147 Utah Adv. Rep. 36

been m a d e . State v. Walker, 743 P . 2 d 191,
193 (Utah 1987); U t a h R. Civ. P . 52(a).
Arranging
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OPINION

G A R F F , Judge:

Defendant, Darrin Lamar Pelton, appeals
his conviction of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance, in violation of § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990), arguing that his involvement did not rise to the level of criminal
culpability.
FACTS

Both parties generally agree on the facts.
Albert Acosta, a narcotics agent, worked with
a confidential informant to set up a drug buy
through Lorraine Coates, who was to introduce Acosta to a drug dealer, "Paco". Subsequently, pursuant to instructions from
another intermediary* Acosta, Chris Baker and
the confidential informant picked up defendant. Defendant then told Acosta to drive to a
7-11 store where they were to make a phone
call and then "the man would bring the
cocaine to that location." At the store defendant and Baker got out of the car and spoke
to a man in a telephone booth, who turned
out to be Paco. Coates was also present.
Acosta told Coates he was uncomfortable with
defendant and Baker present, so Coates called
Paco over and defendant and Baker left. The
drug purchase was later consummated between
Paco and Acosta at a different location.
S T A N D A R D OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
at a bench trial, as occurred here, we will n o t
set aside the verdict unless clearly e r r o n e o u s ,
a n d where the result is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or we otherwise reach a definite a n d firm conviction that a mistake has

to

Distribute

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1990)1 provides, "it is unlawful for any
person to knowingly and intentionally ...
arrange to distribute a controlled ... substance." In State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986), the supreme court in interpreting the
statute that preceded the above section, stated
that "any witting or intentional lending of aid
in the distribution of drugs, in whatever form
the aid takes, is proscribed by the act. In other
words, any act in furtherance of arrang(ing) to
distribute ... a ... controlled substance* constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to the
statute." Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis in original)
(quoting State v.Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 92324 (Utah 1979)).
J Defendant argues that it was Coates who
actually called Paco over to the car and introduced him to Acosta, and that he never
possessed the cocaine, never directed Acosta to
the house where the cocaine was purchased,
was not present when the transaction occurred, and never discussed prices or handled
any money. Therefore, defendant argues, he
cannot be considered a participant in the arrangement. He cites several cases to support
this position: State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44
(Utah 1987) (defendant discussed the purchase
with officers, set a price, and agreed to make
the exchange); State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d
103 (Utah 1983) (court described defendant's
activities to be a classic case of arranging
when defendant directed an undercover officer
to the drug buy location, procured money
from the officer, purchased the drugs, and
delivered the marijuana to him); State v. Clark,
783 P.2d 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (defendant
attempted to contact the drug dealer, commented on the quality of the cocaine, was
present during the sale negotiations and
warned the undercover officer of a tailing
car). However, nothing in these cases prevents
the inclusion of the acts of defendant within
the statutory prohibition.
We conclude that defendant's actions were
sufficient to bring him within the proscription
of the statute as interpreted by Gray and Harrison. Defendant was one link in a chain
of events, involving six people, which eventually led to the sale of cocaine. There was
ample evidence from which the trial court
could properly conclude that defendant knew
that he would be the triggering mechanism to
bringing Acosta and Paco together when he
had Acosta drive to the 7-11 store, and that
he also knew the transaction involved the sale
of cocaine. The fact that Paco was present at
the 7-11 store negated the need to make the
phone call to have the cocaine delivered.
Defendant and Coates each spoke to Paco at
the telephone booth. Paco then made contact

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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with Acosta and subsequently sold him the
cocaine. Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally, and he was instrumental in arranging the sale of the cocaine.
Constitutional Application
Defendant also asserts that the arranging
statute was unconstitutionally applied to his
case. Defendant argues that the supreme court
in Srafe v. Harrison, by proscribing "any
activity," unconstitutionally broadened the
application of the arranging statute. The language in question is as follows:
A statute may legitimately proscribe
a broad spectrum of conduct with a
very few words, so long as the outer
perimeters of such conduct are
clearly defined. The statute in question accomplishes this by specifying that any activity leading to or
resulting in the distribution ... of a
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e must be
engaged in knowingly or with intent
that such distribution would, or
would be likely to occur. Thus, any
witting or intentional lending of aid
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by
the act.
610 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added).
Defendant's argument is that Harrison
renders the arranging portion of the statute
unconstitutionally vague. A law is impermissibly vague when it "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice" that a contemplated act is forbidden. Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting
United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)). The underlying principle is that one
should not be held criminally responsible for
conduct in cases where one could not understand the proscription. Id.
In Harrison the Utah Supreme Court holds
that the arranging statute is such that "[t]he
citizen of average intelligence is left with no
confusion as to what type of conduct is forbidden " 601 P.2d at 923-24. We see Harrison
as a legitimate definition of "arrange" as used
in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1989). Harrison clarifies rather than
confuses the scope of the arranging statute.
Thus, totally aside from the conceptual
problem presented by this court's presuming
to declare that a prior supreme court decision
rendered a criminal statute unconstitutional, as
defendant would have us do, we find defendant's contention to be without merit.
Affirmed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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1. Prior to 1987, arranging for the distribution of a
controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. §58-378(l)(a)(iv) (1986), was a separate offense from actual
distribution. Utah Code Ann. §§58-378(l)(a)(ii) (1986), 58-37-8(l)(c) (1986). In 1987,
section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii), as amended, combined
the offenses of arranging and distributing into one
section. State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
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FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NOV 2 8 1990
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Ct*M<« *» Court

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890509-CA

Darrin Lamar Pelton,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 14, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for Rehearing
is denied.
Dated this

zsfa
&°
day of November, 1990.

FOR THE COURT

1/JjJ \($£M^
ary T./Nobnan, Clerk

